Introduction
For the last three decades, income disparity within the U.S. has been widening.' After the Occupy Wall Street protests, the nation is undoubtedly conscious of this growing disparity. 2 It is unlikely, however, that the nation is conscious of the compliance burden disparity experienced by low and moderate income taxpayers. For taxpayers claiming the EITC, lower income brings Executive Order 13520 contributes to the landscape of federal improper payment law, but it could provide relief to EITC and its claimants. Executive Order 13520 requires federal agencies with programs representing the highest improper payments to submit plans to reduce these improper payments, but the plans may not "unduly [burden] program access and participation by eligible beneficiaries." 23 Correspondence examinations, and more specifically the manner in which they are conducted, unduly burden access to EITC, and this contravenes the Executive Order 13520 requirement to refrain from an undue burden for program access. This Article is divided into six Parts to address the collision of EITC and the correspondence examination process with Executive Order 13520 and its kindred improper payment laws. In Part I, this Article discusses improper payment laws, including Executive Order 13520. Part II identifies the alleged EITC overpayment rate and comments on the trigger of improper payment program requirements. Part II also highlights the fact that EITC is the only Department of Treasury or Service program subject to such scrutiny, even though EITC comprises only five percent of the tax gap. 24 Part III discusses how the Service executes its compliance mission and function via the correspondence examination process, and Part IV offers evidence that the correspondence examination process often impedes legitimate claimant access to EITC. Part V concludes that the Service's use of correspondence examinations unduly burdens access to EITC in contravention of Executive Order 13520. Finally, in Part VI, the Article examines possible solutions, including previous and current Service Pilot projects.
I. Accountability Via Improper Payment Law
The U.S. faces burgeoning spending, debt levels, and lower revenue receipts due, at least in part, to the recent recession and sluggish national growth. 25 In addition, there is heightened 25. See Catherine Rampell, Sure Cure for the Debt Problem: Economic Growth, N. Y. TIMES, July 30, 2011, at BU1 ("We face the largest budget deficit the nation has ever known: $1.6 trillion, the equivalent of about 11 percent of our economy. And, whatever Washington does, many economists say the situation will grow only worse, particularly as Americans age and Medicare costs spiral higher."); see also Harry Bradford, U.S. Economy Surpasses Pre-Recession Level After 45 Months, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 28, 2011, 6:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ political rhetoric calling, in many cases, for smaller government and, at the very least, more efficient government. 26 One way to control spending and to reform governmental administration is to closely monitor and control governmental payments to third parties.
It is not difficult to find political support for limiting and monitoring improper payments by the federal government. 27 en couched in terms of merely requiring the federal government to properly execute its duties and refrain from abetting activities that sound like fraud, improper payment legislation garners near unanimous support. 28 Congress passed and the president signed improper payment legislation in 2002 and 2010. 29 President Obama added more processes to the minimization of improper payments with Executive Order 13520 in 2009 and two presidential memoranda in 2010. 30 This legislation and manifestation of executive administrative power creates a more systematic framework for improper payment identification, measurement, planning, and reporting. What follows is a brief overview of the legislative and presidential contributions to improper payment law. While each offers contribution to the improper payment landscape, it is Executive Order 13520 that provides the possible opportunity for change in EITC compliance.
2011/10/28/us-gdp-growth-us-economy-surpasses-pre-recession-level-45-months n_1064016.html (reporting on recession and U.S. economic growth levels).
26. See Brent Cebul, Government, Big or Small, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/23/opinion/la-oe-cebul-smaller-govt-20120123 (noting President Obama's rhetoric promising smaller, more efficient government); see also Mitt Romney, Address at the Detroit Economic Club (Feb. 21, 2012), DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 24, 2012, available at http://www.freep.com/article/ 20120224/NEWS15/120224034/Text-of-Mitt-Romney-s-speech-to-the-DetroitEconomic-Club ("By making bold cuts in spending and commonsense entitlement reforms, we will make our government simpler, smaller, and smarter . . . . Together, let's put America on the path toward more jobs, less debt, and smaller government.").
A. Improper Payments Act of 2002
Prior to the passage of the Improper Payments Act of 2002 (IPIA), there was no universal federal agency requirement to report or analyze wrongly made payments by the federal government." The IPIA began the process by requiring executive branch agencies "to review annually all programs and activities they administer and identify those which may be susceptible to significant erroneous payments." 3 2 A program is at "significant" risk with $10 million of improper payments.". If an agency has improper payments greater than the $10 million trigger IPIA requires the agency to estimate annual improper payments and report on its actions for reducing these improper payment
34
estimates.
To comply with IPIA, federal agencies typically report their findings in their agency performance and accountability reports (PARs), annual financial reports (AFRs), or annual reports." The IPIA's process and reporting demands have, at the very least, allowed the federal government to have an increasingly comprehensive picture of the universe of improper payments." 6 ways: dollar amount trigger and timing of reporting. 9 Whereas IPIA requires reporting programs with improper payments exceeding $10 million, OMB guidance states that reporting is only required for programs meeting the $10 million threshold and improper payments amounting to at least 2.5% of total program payments. 40 Critics noted that the addition of the 2.5% threshold exempted a number of programs from IPIA requirements that would have met the statutory trigger. OMB guidance also faced criticism because it enabled programs with substantial improper payments, so long as they were under the technical thresholds to avoid risk assessment planning with regard to improper payments, which, of course, defeated the purpose of the legislation.4
In other words, critics suggested that there was too little process when an agency's improper payments were less than $10 million and 2.5%.
OMB guidance went even further by augmenting the IPIA reporting time periods. IPIA required annual reporting; however, OMB guidance allowed for reporting every three years for "low risk" programs.' While OMB's guidance drew criticism, OMB was somewhat vindicated when the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA) codified OMB guidance."
B. Executive Order 13520 & Subsequent Presidential
Memoranda While the IPIA served to highlight the problem of agency improper payments to federal agencies and the public, the law itself, as well as OMB's guidance, failed to capture significant improper payments in the processes and provided only a very basic framework for agency consideration of these payments. In late 2009, President Obama signed Executive Order 13520 to extend the IPIA by providing more processes for reporting on improper payments. Specifically, Executive Order 13520 requires: * OMB to identify federal programs with the highest improper payments; * OMB to set reduction targets for those programs, and 
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Agencies to designate an official accountable for meeting the OMB reduction targets "without unduly burdening program access and participation by eligible beneficiaries,"; * Agencies to report to their inspector generals regarding measuring improper payments and the agency's plan to meet the reduction targets without unduly burdening program access." It should be noted that Executive Order 13520 has a different trigger than the IPIA. Under Executive Order 13520, an agency's "highest" improper payments trigger the process, as opposed to the IPIA's dollar and percentage triggers. Because Executive Order 13520 does not change the IPIA and only adds another layer of process, its trigger subjects more agencies and programs to improper payment law.
Most significant for the purposes of this Article, however, is Executive Order 13520's recognition that an agency should not minimize improper payments in manners that unduly burden beneficiary access to, and participation in, federal programs. This requirement was missing from both the IPIA and also the later IPERA.
In 
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rates, a review of agency annual reports and agency inspector general reports illustrates that most agencies appear to be publicly reporting (and perhaps by extension, paying more attention) to the level of improper payments.' With implementation of IPERA in progress, the addition of more specific and mandatory processes should decrease improper payments. It is possible, however, that these processes could initially have the opposite effect by flagging previously unknown improper payments. This could, at least temporarily, increase the number of known improper payments and give the impression that this improper payment regime is not successful. 9
II. EITC & Improper Payments
While Part I offered an overview of improper payment law, Part II will briefly examine the EITC to lay a foundation for identifying and explaining the alleged level of EITC overpayments. Significant scholarship examining the EITC is available from a number of sources." 0 Accordingly, this Article only provides enough EITC information to advance an understanding of the EITC's intersection with improper payment law.
A. What is the EITC?
The EITC provides a refundable tax credit to low-income taxpayers. 61 A refundable credit is one that not only offsets a taxpayer's tax liability but can also result in a cash payment in excess of tax liability.
62 EITC increases with the amount of earned income a taxpayer reports, thereby functioning as an incentive to work." Its design, as part direct payment and part tax offset, is Most EITC claimants must prove, among other things, three primary items: earned income, relationship of qualifying children, and minimum residency of qualifying children.' EITC is available to claimants without children but increases dramatically when a qualifying child resides with a claimant for more than half of the tax year.
6 ' EITC further increases with the number of "qualifying children" who reside with the claimant." Prior to 2009, EITC payments plateaued for claimants with two qualifying children. In other words, a claimant did not receive any additional EITC for three (or more) children than for two children. Pursuant to the Tax Relief Act of 2010, EITC increased for claimants with three children." The third-child expansion is temporary for two years, which is in addition to the original two-year expansion under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.n There has been discussion opining that the previous two-child maximum created an incentive for larger families to improperly allow others to claim their other children." Taxpayers who are found to have fraudulently claimed the EITC may not receive it for ten years, even if they are otherwise eligible." EITC claims that are made recklessly, or with intentional disregard of the rules, render a taxpayer unable to claim EITC for two years, even if they are otherwise eligible."
See
Penalties for fraudulent, reckless, or intentionally improper EITC claims are more severe than penalties for fraud in other social assistance programs. 76 Benefits under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) may be denied for an entire family for a month due to noncompliance, and repeated noncompliance may result in denial for up to six months." Food stamp programs have similar sanctions. In these other benefits programs, repeated abuse only garners sanctions for months, whereas comparable actions garner sanctions lasting years under EITC.
There are, of course, civil penalties for non-EITC reckless or fraudulent violations of the Internal Revenue Code." Non-EITC penalties, however, pale in comparison to the EITC civil penalties, and they do not bar future use of any code section for which a taxpayer is otherwise eligible. 0 Indeed, with respect to EITC sanctions, " [t] here are no analogous sanctions applicable to other improper positions taken on federal income tax returns."' Penalties for EITC abuse, criminal or civil, are significantly harsher than sanctions for other tax violations or other social benefit abuse. These heavier penalties are consistent with the earned income, but fewer than two qualifying children of their own. 73. See I.R.C. § 32(k) (disallowing EITC for taxpayers making fraudulent and reckless EITC claims for ten years and two years respectively). impression that EITC is riddled with fraud."

C. Improper EITC Payment Rates
There certainly exists an impression of significant EITC fraud, and many interpret the government's improper payment numbers to support this theory." The Treasury Department estimates total EITC program payments for FY 2010 as $64 billion,' and EITC overpayment rates of twenty-three to twentyeight percent or $15-18 billion." The estimated EITC overpayment rate has remained constant at twenty-three to twenty-eight percent for several years and is not expected to change through 2013. 6 The Service has argued that impending preparer regulation will shrink the future EITC overpayment rate," but in examining the Service's expectation, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) found no evidence to expect a positive impact on the rate."
The annual EITC overpayment estimate ranks it fourth in relative size of programs with improper payment estimates.8 (attributing all EITC improper payments to "fraud" by "cheaters" filing "phony" returns). individuals." The responses of both TIGTA and the Service fail to acknowledge the power and process the Service undertakes to administer and police EITC. Their responses belie the Service's toolbox, which includes the use of correspondence exams, math error authority, and civiland preparer penalties.
III. Managing EITC with Correspondence Examinations
In Part II, this Article identified the alleged level of EITC overpayments. Part III attempts to explain the process that identifies the alleged improper payments: the correspondence examination process. This Part will explain how returns are selected for examination, as well as how often and why the Service utilizes correspondence examinations to audit EITC taxpayers.
A. Return Selection for Correspondence Examination
The Service executes its taxpayer compliance function with the examination process."' Typically, the Service utilizes a correspondence examination, office examination, or a field examination,"' which involve escalating degrees of Service personnel involvement. With a limited budget and personnel, "the Service uses sophisticated computer technology and the accumulated experience of its personnel in the classification and selection of returns" with the greatest potential for tax change and revenue yield for examination."' Returns are chosen for audit by computer analysis that "numerically scores tax returns according to a mathematically determined probability of error.""'
The Service has recently placed an emphasis on honing EITC audit selection, "spen[ding] millions of dollars developing probability filters to improve its selection of cases for audit using information contained in the Dependent Database.""' The Service ("Probability filters are characteristics of noncompliance the IRS has developed using historical data and are used to determine the likelihood that an EITC claim is erroneous. The Dependent Database is a risk-based audit selection tool used by the IRS to identify EITC tax returns for audit."). also uses prior audit information to inform its audit selection."' Recently, the Service has increasingly used third-party information from non-Service sources, including the Federal Case Registry, which is a database of custody orders for children receiving public assistance and custody orders from some private divorce cases, as well as information from the Social Security Administration databases to validate social security numbers and parents' names for qualifying children."
6 TIGTA believes that the Service is leveraging this technology to identify EITC improper payments."' Even with all of these investments into EITC error detectors, the Service has made virtually no progress in limiting the EITC improper payments."" As previously stated, overpayment rates are alleged to have hovered between twentythree percent and thirty percent for years and are predicted to remain at the same level for several more years."' Other than some educational public relations activities and the impending regulation of preparers, the Service has not committed to any new plans for reducing the EITC improper payment rate.120 It appears that the Service intends to continue using correspondence examinations as the primary compliance tool for EITC administration.
B. Why Use Correspondence Examinations?
No doubt a primary driver for the Service's choice of correspondence examinations to manage EITC claims is the low cost. Correspondence exams are less expensive because they are more automated, requiring less personnel labor than office or field examinations.121 The Service estimates that its administration of EITC costs less than one percent of benefits distributed. 122The
115. See Landsmann, supra note 4, at slides 10, 11 (on file with the author). 116. Id Current administration costs are less than 1% of benefits delivered. This is quite different from other non-tax benefits programs in which administrative costs related to determining eligibility can range as high as 20% of program expenditures. For TY 2009, the IRS reports that it paid $55 billion in EITC claims. If this amount had been paid by another agency that spent 20 percent of program expenditures verifying eligibility, the administration costs to the government would have been $11 billion -nearly 100 percent of the amount of improper payments that the IRS estimates were made.
Id.
125. See Lipman, supra note 3, at 465 (commenting that EITC claimants manage the "inconceivable complexity" of the credit by hiring paid tax practitioners to assist them).
126. For tax year 2009, 57.3% of all individual returns were prepared by preparers.as Seventy percent of EITC claimants use preparers.' It is evident that many of the costs of tax administration are transferred to taxpayers by virtue of self-assessment and code complexity, which, in many cases, requires professional assistance. This is certainly true for EITC administration, and the transfer of the cost for EITC administration is borne by those least able to afford it.
Experience does not seem to help alleviate the complexity and professional assistance problem. Recent studies indicate that changes to the EITC population may contribute to the long-term ineffectiveness of EITC education and public relations activities that the Service has undertaken.'' Sixty-one percent of EITC claimants from 1989 to 2006 claimed EITC for only one or two years at a time.13' The study indicated that only twenty percent of EITC claimants used EITC for more than five consecutive years.' 7 Accordingly, efforts to educate an ever-changing population are likely ineffective. Any experience or knowledge which might be helpful for claiming EITC is likely only useful to a small number of 
132.
See Lipman, supra note 3, at 463 ("Congress has created an extensive antipoverty program, which is almost impossible for the targeted families to obtain without professional assistance because it is too complicated to comprehend and claim."). repeat claimants.
IRS, SOI Tax
C. Audit Rates and Reasons
With its limited resources for tax administration and compliance initiatives, the Service often takes the path of least resistance. In this case, the path of least resistance is auditing the "easy" returns. For the Service, EITC returns are easy returns: low-income returns tend to be simple, with fewer items of income and few, if any, deductions;... EITC claimants rarely respond to correspondence examination correspondence;"' nearly the entire process is automated and has limited Service personnel involvement;... EITC claimants are unlikely to be able to afford or even secure free representation.1 4 ' For the Service, EITC returns are the proverbial low-hanging fruit.
To illustrate the over-emphasis on EITC audits, commentators often compare EITC and self-employed audits.
14 2
Auditing self-employed taxpayers would likely yield more revenue than auditing EITC claimants, given that twenty percent of the tax gap is attributable to self-employed taxpayers (as opposed to only five percent of the tax gap attributable to EITC 138. EITC is not available for taxpayers with over $2200 in investment income. [W]hile the IRS estimate of the EITC noncompliance rate is high, it is not the highest. The IRS estimates that taxes owed but unpaid by individual and corporate taxpayers is over $100 billion (the "tax gap"). In addition, the IRS states that its enforcement efforts only resulted in the collection of about 25% of the tax gap. Underreported income by self-employed taxpayers was nearly $30 billion of the tax gap. The estimated tax gap for the EITC exceeded $1 billion. The EITC therefore represents less than 1% of the tax gap. The IRS estimates that self-employed individuals generally underreport their income by 64%, and self-employed individuals who operate in a cash business underreport their income by 89%. Small corporations and sole proprietors constitute 29% of the tax gap. Thus, significant noncompliance areas that generate greater revenue losses than are estimated for the EITC go unaudited. Id.
I.R.C. § 32(i)(1).
Hearing on the Tax Gap and Tax
overpayments)."
However, examination of self-employed taxpayers would likely take significant time and personnel resources to produce revenue, because discovering underreported income is much more labor-intensive than verifying documentation provided by an EITC taxpayer.' 44 Moreover, it would be more difficult to audit self-employed taxpayers via correspondence exams given the alleged levels of underreported income."' The audit rate for self-employed taxpayers is 1.9%, and the audit rate for EITC taxpayers is 2.1%,"' which is nearly 10% higher.
The audit rate for taxpayers with less than $25,000 income is 1.22%, which is significantly higher than the rate for taxpayers with $25,000-$200,000 of income which is 0.73%-1.00%.117 The audit rate does not rise to the level that the lowest-income taxpayers experience until income goes above $200,000. '4 This should not be surprising given the history of resources specifically earmarked to police the EITC."' Both scholars and reporters have noted the 1990s compromise between President Clinton and Congress that resulted in an increase in the Service's budget by $100 million specifically to audit EITC returns. only drivers of high EITC audit rates. Improper payment law requirements are certainly a driver, as they require the Service to demonstrate and execute a plan to bring down EITC improper payments." ' Other commentators believe that heavy EITC compliance initiatives are attributable to the perception that EITC is "welfare" and the cultural belief that "cheating on one's income tax [is] ... less seriously wrong than committing welfare fraud." " Still others have suggested that EITC compliance initiatives may be driven by "the belief that EITC errors are the result of fraud [which] is a function of racial stereotyping about EITC recipients.""' Regardless of why EITC claimants are chosen for audit, the data demonstrate that they are chosen for correspondence examinations at a higher rate than comparable groups of taxpayers
D. An EITC Correspondence Examination
Once an EITC return is selected for audit via scoring, a letter is generated asking for information or documentation to verify one or more of the EITC requirements." 6 The correspondence typically requests the EITC claimant to submit documentation to prove relationship to, or residency of, the qualifying children.
7 A 2010 study by the Taxpayer Advocate Service "TAS" of 400 EITC cases noted that "[in ninety percent of the cases reviewed, the primary issue raised by the IRS involved either the Relationship Test or the Residency Test under the uniform definition of a 'qualifying child."'"
These are the lynchpins in securing EITC, and they create proof issues during a correspondence examination. These proof issues are discussed below in Part IV. "
IV. Correspondence Examinations Impede Access to EITC
The previous Part addressed how, why, and how often EITC claimants are chosen for examination. The following Part will explore the conduct of EITC correspondence examinations and lay 65 While in theory school records should be easily used to prove residency in the EITC claimant's home, the practice does not work well. School records document residency during a school year, which usually runs August-December (five months) and January-May (five months). Both semesters of a school year are less than the six months necessary to prove EITC residency, which is measured on a tax year basis(January through December).'"
See Olson, Ways and Means
The atypical documentation that claimants often must submit can prove challenging during correspondence exams for a number of reasons. The types of documents used to prove the relationship and residency tests are not the types of documents that the Service specializes in dealing with, such as W2s, 1099s, and other returns."' With respect to traditional documentation, the Service has established processes for data matching and analysis.'" The Service struggles, however, to data mine atypical documentation. Simply put, dealing with the Service during a correspondence examination is difficult.
EITC claimants chosen for audit have virtually no alternatives to the correspondence exam process: once a claimant is chosen under the computerized system, the claimant is almost
Id. ("[T]he IRS had not developed and implemented examination filters to identify potentially erroneous claims for the Homebuyer Credit."). TIGTA identified the following:
Taxpayers claimed Homebuyer Credits although they had not made home purchases but reportedly would in the future. These taxpayers listed home acquisition dates on their Forms 5405 that were subsequent to the dates the claims were processed by the IRS.
Taxpayers claimed Homebuyer Credits for homes for which at least one other taxpayer also claimed the Credit and the combined amounts for each address exceeded $8,000. Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 111th Cong. 8 (2010) (written testimony of Nina Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate) ("[The specific requirements of each revision of the FTHBC involve enhanced documentation that prevents taxpayers from electronically filing their tax returns, causing administrative problems for the IRS.").
174. See Landsmann, supra note 4, at slide 13 (on file with author).
See Olson, Ways and
Means, supra note 63, at 14 (describing the effect of difficult proof burdens on improperly denied claims).
176. See Marchbein, supra note 15 ("For most taxpayers, an examination is fraught with anxiety, which can only be compounded if correspondence explaining the taxpayer's position or providing requested information or verification seems not to have been duly taken into account by the IRS.").
certain to face a correspondence examination." In 2010, nearly ninety-seven percent of audited EITC returns were undertaken with correspondence examination."' 7 Under Treasury regulation 301.7605-1, a taxpayer may petition to change the venue, which could mean changing from a correspondence examination (i.e., campus examination) to a face-to-face office examination. 1 
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This regulation gives the Service the discretion to grant the request after considering six factors."' Despite the list of factors, "Imlany IRS service centers take the view that correspondence examinations will be transferred only in instances of hardship.""'
The ability to take advantage of the very slim opportunity to transfer from a correspondence examination turns on the taxpayer's ability to understand the correspondence sufficiently to find the regulation to transfer, comprehend the availability of the option, and successfully argue for transfer. " 2 Ironically, these are the precise skills that a taxpayer needs to successfully navigate a correspondence exam. If the taxpayer lacks these skills to begin with, there is virtually no chance he or she will successfully argue for a more navigable and comprehensible examination.
Assuming that a taxpayer is chosen for correspondence examination, navigation of the process involves successful with the 177. See IRS, 2010 DATA BOOK, supra note 4, at tbl. 9a.
Id.
179.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7605-1(e) (1993).
The Department of Treasury Regulations state:
The Service will consider, on a case-by-case basis, written requests by taxpayers or their representatives to change the place that the Service has set for an examination. In considering these requests, the Service will take into account the following factors-(i) The location of the taxpayer's current residence;
(ii) The location of the taxpayer's current principal place of business; (iii) The location at which the taxpayer's books, records, and source documents are maintained; (iv) The location at which the Service can perform the examination most efficiently; (v) The Service resources available at the location to which the taxpayer has requested a transfer; and (vi) Other factors that indicate that conducting the examination at a particular location could pose undue inconvenience to the taxpayer.
Id.
181. Marchbein, supra note 15. (arguing that the correspondence system is "uniquely challenging to low-income taxpayers who may lack the skills required to navigate the tax return and audit processes").
Service.'" Interpreting the Service's correspondence is not easy for any taxpayer (nor any practitioner), but it is particularly difficult for low-income taxpayers who are more likely to have functional literacy" and financial literacy"' challenges."' The Service's correspondence suffers from deficiencies in basic readability. The systems that the Service uses to generate taxpayer correspondence are admittedly antiquated."' While some EITC correspondence has been redesigned to address readability issues, many others have not and continue to appear in the same, unchanged form." The typeface, layout, and whitespace make it difficult to read old, unchanged correspondence."' The aesthetics are compounded by the substantive readability problems. The sentences are complex and not written in plain language, and worse, the letters use Service and tax jargon that mean nothing to the average taxpayer."' In a study of EITC taxpayers, more than seventy note 6, at 104 (commenting that 42.7% of the study participants "[did not percent thought that examination correspondence was difficult to understand."' The tone of the Service's correspondence is often overly harsh and legalistic, which tends to frighten taxpayers.'" The most concerning results of the EITC audit correspondence study were the conclusions that, after reading the Service's correspondence, over a quarter did not understand that the Service was auditing their return, and nearly another quarter did not understand what documents to send to the Service. ' The failure to understand the substance of the Service's correspondence makes it nearly impossible to comply with its requests.
C. The Service's Phone Issues
Confusing correspondence prompts taxpayers to call the Service for clarification and assistance. Unfortunately, phone contact with the Service creates a host of additional issues. In Fiscal Year 2008, the Service's level of service (LOS) for its tollfree lines was fifty-three percent." Almost half of taxpayers who called the Service in FY 2008 were not helped. Since then, the Service's phone LOS has been "in the low-seventy percent range."'. The Service's goal is to answer eighty percent of its calls, and the IRS Oversight Board believes that even getting to the eighty percent level, where a full twenty percent of taxpayers are not assisted when they call, will cost another $100 million.'
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The Service's failure to answer the phone when taxpayers call is a significant issue. An inability to reach the Service to clarify questions can cause taxpayers to give up, resulting in a failure to respond to the Service's notices.'" Inaction by an EITC taxpayer will cause them to lose, in many cases, thousands of EITC dollars that could be keeping their family out of poverty.
D. Access to Examiners
Correspondence examination cases are only assigned to an understand some words/terms"). Cases in which a written response is not received are worked completely through an automated audit system.'" The correspondence examination process is designed to minimize contact with the Service's personnel, which is how the cost savings are realized.
200
A taxpayer who calls the Service does not necessarily trigger the Service's filters to be labeled as a responsive taxpayer, and can find him or herself on the receiving end of additional correspondence stating that he or she has failed to contact the Service along with a notice of deficiency.
20 ' This is a problem when, as a study suggests, ninety percent of EITC audited taxpayers attempted to contact the Service about their audit, with nearly seventy-five percent of them calling or personally visiting the Service.
2 " As noted above, however, these are not the actions that get a correspondence case assigned to a person.203 These EITC claimants are contacting the IRS because they do not understand the letter, or are having difficulty with the documents the Service seeks. Until very recently, the Service's initial EITC correspondence did not designate an employee who could be contacted about the examination.
20
' Even now, the correspondence only designates a supervisor, and callers are routed to any available employee, 206 assuming that the call is even answered.'" Evidence has indicated that the phone line where EITC calls were routed was not staffed, 2 08 and callers were forced to leave a message.2" 0 Anecdotal evidence suggests that return calls were rarely made from the EITC voicemail. 1 o
E. Document Logging and Matching
Even when EITC claimants understood correspondence or were able to receive clarification about the documents sought, forwarding the documents to the Service often made little difference in the examination.
2 " Document matching is a serious problem for the Service.
21 ' The Service has significant delays in mail routing and in reading received mail. 212 If mail is not logged into the Service's system correctly or in a timely fashion, the automated correspondence system continues actions based on the belief that the taxpayer has not responded or submitted the requisite substantiation.
2
The Service has admitted that the premature issuance of statutory notices of deficiency is based on mail handling problems.
21 5 Although some areas of the Service utilize barcode correspondence for document matching purposes, the EITC area in Small Business/Self Employed does not, and has refused to implement such a provision. 216 While the Service claims to have addressed its mail handling issues, 2 1 7 this author believes that problems with logging, matching, and processing correspondence remain, and result in denial of EITC taxpayer rights. 220 Audit reconsideration is a Service appeals process in which a taxpayer asks to have their examination reviewed for accuracy."' Between forty percent and forty-five percent of EITC claimants whose EITC claims were denied or reduced during the correspondence examination process received additional EITC upon audit reconsideration.
F. Studies Show EITC Audit
222
In other words, nearly half of EITC claimants failing the audit process were in fact eligible for EITC. It follows that being declared ineligible during the correspondence examination process is not necessarily indicative of ineligibility. Research from TAS suggests "that the EITC claims of many taxpayers are denied for lack of documentation even if they could meet applicable residence and relationship requirements." 22 3
A lack of taxpayer response cannot be viewed as indicative of a lack of ineligibility either. In the same TAS study, forty-two percent of the taxpayers were categorized as "late response" or "no response";... however, nearly half of these taxpayers ultimately received favorable outcomes.
22 5 In other words, the initially nonresponsive taxpayersreceived some amount of EITC. This outcome rate is comparable to taxpayers who were responsive.
226
Extrapolating these findings would cut the alleged improper payment rate nearly in half.
G. EITC Overpayment Rate is Likely Incorrect
In the 2004 TAS Audit Reconsideration Study, "over forty percent of all taxpayers with representatives emerged from their audit with their full EIC intact.""' Another way of looking at this is that of a subset of 427,807 taxpayers claiming EITC who received payment and were later audited (the Service would call these improper payment post-audit), a substantial portion, perhaps even as many as forty percent, may not have beenimproper, if they had access to representation during audit.
232
Without the extraordinary efforts relating to this study, the Service would have considered the forty percent in the EITC improper payment calculation.
23 3 Taking it a step further, if, as in the TAS study, forty percent of EITC audits are not improper payments, and assuming we could translate this to the overpayment rate, then the EITC annual overpayment rate drops to between fourteen to seventeen percent.
A potential criticism is that this calculation cannot be extrapolated because the sample population was arguably a motivated subset of individuals who felt they were wrongly denied access to EITC."' Admittedly, this is not a representative sample. It is nonetheless indicative of the existence of serious, widespread, and systematic barriers for claiming the EITC."' Even if the forty percent error rate found for EITC improper payments in the TAS study cannot be directly applied because of methodological issues, First, the rate is based on three studies of EITC errors that considered a claimant's inability to document EITC as an overpayment, which (as shown by the TAS study) may "reflect premature and incorrect judgments."
239 Second, the error rate does not consider underpayments. 24 ' In a February 2011 report, TIGTA demonstrated that the Service ignores EITC underpayments in its improper payment calculation, in contravention of the OMB guidance.
2 '1 Additionally, in cases where the incorrect parent may have claimed EITC, the Service does not research, calculate, or include the possible underpayment (or lack of payment) to the appropriate EITC parent.
242
The actual rate of EITC improper payments is probably not nearly as high as the Service reports.
243
In addition, several commentators have discussed the role of unintentional error due to complexity as a significant contributor to the reported improper payment rate. As Professor Book has stated, "[elven though the IRS has studied and reported on EITC extensively there is very little data regarding how much EITC noncompliance relates to intentional conduct and how much relates to unintentional error." 24 5
V. Continued Use of Correspondence Examinations Contravenes Executive Order 13520
The previous four Parts have attempted to explain the intersection of improper payment law, the earned income tax credit, and correspondence examinations. The ultimate conclusion should be obvious: the manner in which the Service uses correspondence examinations to administer the EITC unduly 
VI. Possible Solutions
The most obvious solution is to simplify eligibility for EITC so that claiming and verifying EITC eligibility is accessible and possible for the low-income taxpayers EITC is designed to help. This, of course, requires congressional action. The current polarized political climate, as shown by the current struggle within Congress to agree to any tax compromises and Congress's decade-long propensity for brinkmanship in tax legislation, limit hope for this solution. As is typical with tax issues on which Congress cannot or will not take action, it falls -to the Service to address the problem.
It is not the intent of this Article to cast the Service as the Id. lone villain in the EITC examination story. Service actions are problematic, but the Service is faced with its own burdens of revenue collection with a tight budget and antiquated systems that have not been fully modernized.
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The Service has periodically undertaken pilots in an attempt to study possible changes to EITC administration. 25 3 Some have been unsuccessful, but others show promise and, more importantly, reflect the possibility that the Service is aware of the EITC's examination undue burden."
A. Precertification Pilot
Given the pressure on the government to reduce expenditures, it is hard to foresee the Service willingly discarding its inexpensive (but arguably ineffectual) correspondence examination process or the minimal staffing it uses with correspondence examinations."' This realization, that change is unlikely to emerge on its own, informs the purpose of this Article, which is to suggest the possibility of a legal catalyst to force change.
The Service has undertaken certain pilot programs for EITC, that demonstrate the Service's recognition of the undue burden that correspondence examinations create for EITC taxpayers. Just a few years ago, the Service piloted an EITC precertification program to minimize improper payments.5
Unfortunately, precertification added another layer of burden for EITC claimants."' The Service ultimately concluded that, despite a variety of alternatives, precertification deterred EITC participation by eligible beneficiaries.
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B. State Data Pilot
In 2010, the Treasury Department began a pilot to assess the ability to use state Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and TANF data to assist in validating EITC eligibility. 26 0 The pilot has four goals: minimizing improper EITC payments, advancing efficiency in the administration of the EITC, improving communications, and reducing barriers to EITC access.' While the Treasury Department identified claimant privacy and consent as possible issues to implementation," a bigger concern is that erroneous state data will create another possible barrier for claimants and serve as a basis for more audits or improper denials during audits.
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C. Examiner Contact Pilot
The Service has recently begun two pilots that have much less risk for harm and also reflect a better understanding of the burdens of EITC examinations.
D. Affidavit Pilot
In another pilot, the Service is testing an expansion of the very limited list of acceptable proof during an EITC correspondence examination.
269
In addition to the list of official records and select letters on official letterhead, examiners will also accept third-party affidavit evidence to prove qualifying child relationship and residency, 270 which are two of the largest proof hurdles.
The Service has already concluded, during its precertification study, that affidavits are "easier for taxpayers to obtain than official documents or letters" and "had a higher acceptance rate than the other two types of documents."
271 This study can also help alleviate some of the proof burden for EITC claimants.
E. Future Possibilities
If expanded for all twenty-six million EITC claimants, 272 these two pilots have the possibility to alleviate some of the burdens of EITC correspondence examinations: a lack of personal contact with Service personnel and documentary proof issues. These two pilots are not, however, a panacea for all of the ills of this process. They do not address, for example, that establishing eligibility for the credit is still far too document intensive, the Service's telephone LOS is likely to remain at abysmally low seventy to eighty percent levels, or the troublesome document logging and matching problem. A more looming reality is that, even if these pilots are successful, the Service is unlikely to secure funding for the universal expansion of telephone contact for all EITC examinations. 27 The economic and political climates make that funding very unlikely. 274 Without it, the EITC correspondence examination process will continue as an unfair and undue burden.
Conclusion
Correspondence examinations have proven insurmountable for many EITC claimants.
2 7 5 According to a TAS study, many 
